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dictionary has more to say about the multiple uses of a word than the simple comment, " family resemblance" "), and not necessarily entailed by his very perceptive insights regarding language as a form of life, the importance o f ordinary language, and the relation of meaning to use. * * * Accordingly I set m yself the task of constructing an argument against this seemingly unnecessary restriction -an argument which, hopefully, might appeal to an orthodox Wittgensteinian. The argument has three parts.
The first step was to recall as many examples as I could o f ordinary uses o f the word "time" , and to write them down just as they occurred to me, without any effort to arrange them in any way or even to eliminate apparent duplications. An attempt was made to include enough context so that circumstances of actual usage could readily be imagined by the reader. The word "time" was chosen as an example for several reasons: it obviously has numerous uses in everyday language; it chanced to be the example employed when Wittgenstein's doctrine on meaning and use was first presented to m e ; and it is pleasingly classical -St. Augustine wondered about time too.
Secondly I attempted to discern similarities and differences in these various uses of the word "tim e" , with a view to arriving at categories into which som e o f these uses might be put. The classification was not intended to be exhaustive; that would have been impossible, and furthermore unnecessary for my purpose, which was to show only that so m e uses could usefully be categorized. In other words, there was to be no claim of establishing rigid or all-inclusive categorial boundaries, as if to sa y : this is the meaning (or these are the meanings) of the word. Nor was there a prior assumption that there must be "something com m on" , a common feature or set of features which the word signifies each time it is used -nor did I discover such a common feature as a result o f my efforts at categorizing.
Thirdly, the question o f purpose had to be faced. Even if I had shown that a classification o f some o f the uses o f a word was possible, was it necessary ? Could it be of any possible use? As Wittgenstein points out very forcefully, we can certainly use words in ordinary conversation without undertaking to draw such definite boundaries, without setting up these categories o f u sa g e: common feature to which "gam e" , for example, refers in each of its uses -rather I am trying to see why this one wordhas so many uses. -W ittgenstein, having perceived the failure of his effort to find a unity (a " general form of the proposition" ) in all uses of language, seems to have concluded that every such enterprise was futile. I would agree that since language is a form of life and therefore, practically speaking, infinitely variable, it is impossible to give an account of all language-games that is at once comprehensive and unified. But this does not entail the impossibility of giving a coherent account of particular parts or areas of language. 11. To the objection that the lexicographer merely notes the " surface gram m ar" (PI, # 664.) of words, I
would reply that a good lexicographer, in addition to the surface gram m ar, also records and arranges the various uses a word has in common speech. He reminds himself (Ibid., § 89.) of the actual uses of the w ord; he does not create meanings ex nihilo. He then often arranges the uses in some sort of order -e.g., proper, analogous, figurative uses. Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot be called an area at all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything with it. -But is it senseless to s a y : " Stand roughly there" ? 12
The remainder of this essay consists therefore o f three parts: a collection of ordinary language expressions containing the word " time" ; an attempt to categorize some of these expressions; and finally, an assessment of the value (i.e., usefulness) of such categorizations, together with further reflections on the relevance of this project to Wittgenstein's remarks concerning family resemblance.
A D ISO R D ER LY C O LLEC TIO N O F E X PR E SSIO N S C O N T A IN IN G T H E W ORD "TIM E" TO W H ICH ARE A PPE N D E D A SE L EC T IO N O F PO ETICA L R E FE R E N C E S TO T IM E ' ‫-‬ ' AN D A FEW M O RE OR LESS RELEV A N T STA TEM EN TS A BO UT T IM E .14
As previously mentioned, these expressions are set down in the order in which I was able to remind myself of them. N o effort has been made to impose any sort of order on them, and very little effort was made to avoid duplication. I have tried to make each example long enough so that a context in ordinary speech might easily be 12 . Ibid., M 70-71.
13. W ittgenstein would most likely not accept poetic references to time as part of ordinary language. I have therefore listed them separately, and have formed my categories without relying on them. However these are in fact among the language games that people play. It seems as though Wittgenstein is not entirely consistent with his own notion about the indefinitely large num ber of language games. In some of these games we are relatively passive with regard to the pieces (words) and the rules; we simply absorb them from our particular environment. In games of this sort problems about word use can indeed usually be solved by recalling ordinary usage. But sometimes we play a more active role, by inventing new words or using old ones in new ways. Scientific neologisms, for example, are used for new discoveries or for more precise communication. Slang is often employed by juvenile, oppressed or criminal groups with the aim of restricting communication to members o f the in-group. The poet also occasionally uses words in new ways, perhaps to express a nuance o f his feelings, perhaps because he finds the sound of the word aesthetically apt in the new context he gives it. I believe that W ittgenstein tends to overlook this active, creative aspect of our language games. Sometimes we do more than simply recall the rules of existing language games. Occasionally we invent new games.
14. W ittgenstein would almost certainly regard statements about time -what it is, what it is like, and so forth -as prime examples of metaphysical befuddlement, because (he would claim) we do not use the word " tim e" that way in ordinary speech. Accordingly I have listed these separately also. They are included simply because people do sometimes say that sort of th in g ; it is one of the language games we actually play with " time" , and hence should not be excluded entirely from our consideration.
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imagined. Except in the poetry section I have, in order to set some limit to this enterprise, confined this collection to uses of the word " time" only (as noun and verb), leaving aside compound words and synonyms. 35. He picked up a copy of Playboy in the dentist's office, and just to pass the time he analyzed the centerfold into its logical atoms. 36. She had nothing else to do, so to make the time go more quickly she taught herself Sanskrit. 
1° C O M M O N E X P R E S S IO N S CONTAINING THE WORD

2° R E F E R E N C E S TO TIME IN P O E T R Y A N D RHETORIC
Let the day perish wherein I was born, And the night in which it was said, There is a man child conceived.
As for that n ig h t,... Let it not be joined unto the days of the year, Let it not come into the number of the months.
Job 3
Man that is born of woman Is of few days, and full of trouble. He cometh forth like a flower, and is cut down : He fleeth also as a shadow, and continueth not. Take time while time is, for time will away.
Ibid
Thomas F u l l e r , Gnomologia, 1732
... The poet binds together by passion and knowledge the vast empire of human society, as it is spread over the whole earth, and over all time. One crowded hour of glorious life Is worth an age without a name.
Give me that old time religion.
And Time the ruined bridge has swept Down the dark stream that seaward creeps. Time is like a river. As soon as a thing is seen it is carried away and another takes its place, and then that other is carried away also.
M arcus A u r e l i u s , M editations
Time is the nurse and breeder of all good.
S h a k e s p e a r e , Two Gentlemen o f Verona
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The illimitable, silent, never-resting thing called time, rolling, rushing on, swift, silent, like an all embracing ocean tide, on which we and all the universe swim like exhalations, like apparitions which are, and then are n o t: this is forever very literally a m iracle; a thing to strike us dumb.
T h o m a s C a r l y l e , " Heroes and Hero-W orship," 1840
Time is a great legalizer.
H. L. M e n c k e n A C L A SSIFIC A TIO N OF SO M E USES OF T H E W ORD " T IM E ‫'-‬
N ot without trepidation I shall begin simply by setting forth my classification of some uses of the word "time" . This will hopefully make the subsequent discussion of the bases of categorization somewhat easier to follow. (Numbers following a colon refer to time-expressions listed in Part I of the preceeding section.) 1 " Time" used to refer to the period or duration of a process, movement, change, activity; " tim e" used to " clock" a process (cf. Ryle) -e.g., how long did it take?
1.1 period with definite limits, specified or unspecified (emphasis on the lim its): 1, 16 (You got here just in time.), 20, 22, 30, 67, 82 (He kept growing all the time he was in the Army.)
1.11 period with definite limits established by comparison with the period of some other activity: 70 (She finished the dishes in record time.), 71.
1.111 (verb) to discover or determine the average speed of a movement by measuring the period it occupies: 72 (We'll time the Ferrari on its next lap.)
1.1111 speed so established, average speed: 91 (We made good time between Chicago and Detroit.)
1.12 process occurring during a definite period (especially w ork): 65b (They get time-and-ahalf for overtime.), also, " I haven't put in enough time with this company to retire at 60."
1.121 pay for work done in a specified period : 65a (... time-and-a-half...)
1.13 period with definite limits established by G o d : 103 (In the fullness of time God sent his Son.)
1.2 period with indefinite limits (emphasis usually on process or activity whose duration is referred to). 2.4 " tim e" used to designate an instant which is beginning, end, or intermediate point of a period, and which is "dated" (designated, denominated) by comparison with the point reached in som e regular m ovem ent used as a standard or " clock" (e.g., earth's diurnal rotation, radiation frequency of cesium atom, most commonly motion of the hands of a particular clock or watch) -i.e., the instant of time as indicated by some sort of clock: 19 (W hat time is it?), 75, 156 (At the tone, the time will be exactly 3 pm.). In summary, the four major categories discovered are: 1) " time" used to refer to a period or duration; 2) "time" used to refer to an instant or an instance; 3) " time" used to refer to a system of measuring duration; and 4) figurative uses -time spoken o f as though it were movement, or space, or a moving thing, or a person.
Remarks on the purpose of this classification and the method used to elaborate it will be found in the concluding section of this essay. At this point I would like to comment on the categories themselves. * * *
The first major distinction which became clear was between those uses of " time" which refer to the p erio d or duration of some activity or process, and those uses which have reference to an instant or instance. An example of the first would be, " You're taking too much time to eat your spinach" ; of the second, " What time did you start ?" These two uses o f "time" are roughly analogous to " line" (regarded as continuous and extended, not -as in calculus -as composed of points everywhere dense) and " point" , i.e., that which begins, ends, or divides a line. More precisely, " tim e" in the first sense (t!) refers to the duration o f a process, activity, task ; whereas "tim e" in the second sense (t2) refers to the term or limit o f that duration, the instant o f its beginning or ending. We might say that t, and t2 are related as the duration of a process and the limits (starting and finishing points) of that process.
And since at the finishing point we have the result o f the process, something achieved by it, we find that " time" (t2) is also used with the sense o f " instance" -that which is actual, which is the case, quod in s ta t: " He has crossed the border illegally six tim es." 16 "Tim e" used in this way stresses the aspect of enumerability somewhat more, perhaps, than does " instance" , but otherwise the two words can be used more or less interchangeably. (E.g., " There have been six instances o f illegal crossing by him ." ) In short, " tim e" as instance, i.e., as actuality, as result o f a process, is closely related to "tim e" as instant, i.e., as final limit o f the duration o f a process. " Time as period or duration (t,) answers the'question, " How long did it take?" " Tim e" as instant (t2) answers the question, " When did it occur?" " It" in the first question refers to som e process; " it" in the second question refers to an event or actuality -which is usually, though not always, the result or final product o f a process. Consider for example the difference between the time spent in walking, and the time of arrival. Walking is a process which is "clocked" by t , ; arriving is an achievement, an actuality which is "dated" by t2.17 Walking is a process which takes time (t,); arriving is a result, an event (etymologically "event" is equivalent to " outcome" ) which occurs at a time (t2), but which takes no time (t,) at a ll.18
Various subsets o f time-expressions are pointed out in the classification under each o f these two main headings. We are, in fact, beginning to perceive and to articulate a few o f the family resemblances in some detail.
* * ♦
The third major category of uses of " time" (t3) includes those which refer to a system o f m easuring tim e (t‫״‬ period). Any measuring would seem to involve comparing the thing to be measured, in this case the duration o f an activity, to a standard of some sort. This implies that the period has to be relatively definite or determinate, so that we can point out more or less precisely (using the degree of exactness appropriate to our purpose in speaking) the times (t2) when the period begins and ends. Since it is the period or duration of some activity we are measuring, the limits o f the period are usually taken from the limiting points of the activity -its beginning and end. (It is also possible to take any recognizable intermediate point in the activity as the initial or final limit o f a period.)
It is important to note that we have a great deal o f latitude in specifying the period to be measured. We can choose to measure the duration o f any activity or process, or o f any part o f a process; and we can furthermore decide to measure the period roughly or precisely (with any degree of precision) -depending on the purpose o f the measurement. For example, a casual inquiry about the driving time between Chicago and Minneapolis might well be answered th u s: " About seven and a half hours." But people involved in a race over the same distance would probably want the time measured much more precisely, perhaps to the nearest hundredth of a second.
The standard against which we measure the period we have determined is the duration o f some regular movement. Thus, it takes as long to drive from Chicago to [R]eaching a conclusion, like arriving in London, solving an anagram and checkmating the king, is not the sort of thing that can be described as gradual, quick or instantaneous." (Ibid., p. 302.) Reaching a conclusion is not a process and is therefore not properly described as quick or slow. But why can it not be instantaneous? If " instant" refers to the (dimensionless) point in tim e which term inates a period, then perhaps " instantaneous" is properly used to refer to an achievement. Thus if someone asks, " How long did it ta k e ? " it makes sense to answer, " It was instantaneous, quick as a flash." -because such an answer means it didn't take any time (t,) at all. (" Quick as a flash" , when used as an answer to " How long?" , is ordinarily used l o j e n y that a length of time is involved, since even though in fact light is not transm itted instantaneously, to the ordinary observer it seems to be.) In short I think Ryle m akes a category mistake by including " instantaneous" , which describes achievements, in the class of words used to describe processes. In working with the list of time-expressions I noticed that there seemed to be quite a few common ways of using the word that did not easily fit into the three categories already described. Though it was never intended that the classification be complete (I had always believed that to be impossible), it turned out to be possible to characterize some of these other uses in ways which showed them to be related to the uses previously categorized.
Using a theory about the nature o f time and motion, I was able to discern how some o f these figurative uses were interrelated and also to explain (hypothetically) their relationships with the uses found in the first three major categories. The theory is essentially Aristotelian, embellished with borrowings from Professor Smart.21 It is not presented here as a true account of the nature o f time and motion ; it is proposed solely 19 . This seems to involve us in an infinite regress: The regular movement used as a standard is one that covers equal distances in equal times. But how can we know that the times are equal without measuring them against a standard other than the one whose regularity is in question? And then how can we tell that this other standard is regular without reference to a third -and so ad infinitum. In practice we rely on experience (the movement seems regular), and on cross-checking. We measure one standard against another: the motion of the clock hands against the apparent movement of the sun, or phases of the moon, or both. If one apparently regular motion is discovered to vary its speed when compared to the others commonly used, these others meanwhile not changing their relationships with one another, we would conclude that the first motion was not in fact regular. O f course there would be no way for us to know about it if all our "clocks" -celestial, biological, atomic and artificial -were to change speed without varying their ratios to one another. But this seems to be a meaningless supposition since it postulates an unknowable standard, a contradiction in terms.
20. Time in this sense is clearly conventional, as is any system of measuring. The standard of measure, the particular period to be measured and the amount of precision sought all depend on the choice of the person doing the measuring, though his choice may be restricted by the limitations and conventions of his particular culture.
as an hypothesis to account for various interesting linguistic phenomena, namely certain rather peculiar uses of "time" . (The expression " to account for" is equivalent here to "to discern relationships," or "to describe more fully particular family resemblances." ) The intention is only to examine the ways in which we com monly speak about motion, space and moving things, since such ways of speaking appear strikingly similar to some ways o f speaking about time: often time is said to flow or pass (like a moving thing); again we speak of moving through time, as though it were a distance to be traversed. Let us begin by recalling how we talk about moving things.
In ordinary speech things are said to move or change. Very often the change, especially if it is called a movement, is said to take place over a certain space or distance; the moving thing itself is said to move over or traverse a particular distance. The distance covered has a certain dimension, and can be represented by a line.22 This line is to be regarded as made up of little lines, not o f points everywhere d en se; note that we are employing a model significantly different from that used in calculus. The assumption is that no number, however large, of zero-dimension points can be added together to produce a line.23
Change (as understood here) is movement or motion, process, actualizing of potential, activity.24 This sort o f change is continuous rather than instantaneous, because it takes place -or can be seen as taking place -over a continuous, extended distance.25 The end or result of change (the " end of the line" , not always reached) is achievement, success, victory, actuality.26
22. The line may be either straight or curved, but since no difference in principle is involved and the account of a straight line is simple we shall generally assume that the line is straight. 23. You can't get something from nothing; accordingly the component parts of a line, which itself must be extended in one dimension, must also have dimension themselves -i.e., they must be " little lines". In this view there is an important difference between a very short line, which must have some dimension, and a point, which has none. The function of points, in this theory, is to m ark the beginning and end of lines; you cannot begin or end a line except at some point. Once a line is drawn you may also designate or m ark off ("point out") additional points along the line, but such interm ediate points are not autom atically actualized merely by drawing the line. The line contains them only potentially -until you mark them off. (The component " little lines" also are said to exist in the line only potentially; they become actual parts only when you actually divide the line by designating one or more intermediate points.)
Several distinctions need to be m ade h e re :
a) The change discussed here is what Aristotle calls accidental change -change o f quantity, quality or location. This sort of change is continuous, it takes tim e ; in short it is process, not achievement. b) "C hange" may also be used as the equivalent o f " result" -e.g., " the change in him". This change is not now going on, but is presumably the result (achievement) of a previously completed change (process). c) Talk about a thing changing or moving can be am biguous:(1) The thing may be moving something else, e.g., pushing it, so that it is said to be the cause of that other thing's being in motion. (2) When the thing itself is in a state of motion it is also said to be moving. 25. This language is used most often of local motion, but the same or similar remarks can be made regarding change of quantity or quality. We can say there is a "distance" between an apple's being small and being large, being green and being ripe -that is, the apple moves from one of these states to the respective opposite not instantaneously, but by a gradual, continuous process. 26. In Aristotelian language, winning is an actualization, not a process." ( S m a r t , art. cit., p. 219.) In the interest of clarity I would rather say that winning is an actuality, while running is an actualization -
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Change and time are seen as intimately related by A ristotle: "Time is number of movement [change, in the sense explained] in respect of the before and after, and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous [i.e., change]." 27
Number is a type o f measurement, and the idea seems to be that we remember the past condition (the " before") of a moving thing, compare that with its present condition (the " after" ), and get time -a measure ( "number" ) of the duration of the motion in question.28 And since we commonly speak o f remembering the past conditions of things, perceiving their present state, and making predictions about their future,29 we often find it convenient to im agine that time is like motion, that motion is like space, and that time and motion exist all at once, as space does (i.e., a line once drawn is all there together at one time (t2). In fact the time (t!) of any motion, and the motion itself, do not exist all at one time (t2). But nevertheless we speak of them as spacial, and often represent them by means o f a certain space -on charts, for example.
We speak of time as though it were motion, or space, or a moving thing -even though we know it is none of these. In so doing we are, I believe, speaking figuratively, metaphorically. The implied simile is that time is like motion, etc., in certain respects: time, like motion and a line (or the space it covers), is continuous and not composed of dimensionless, indivisible instants; I can designate an instant in time just as I can designate a point on a line or a point reached in an ongoing motion. Professor Smart characterizes this sort of talk -about time flowing, moving quickly or slowly, or about ourselves moving through time -as an area of " shifted syntax" ‫״3.‬ I prefer to describe it as figurative speech.
Thus if we were to say that change (process) has the power to destroy,31 we might also say that time (t" the period of a change -imperceptible without change and thus closely associated with it) has the same power. Space is usually spoken of as something which endures while things move through it. Time is associated with space by means of change: motion takes time, motion (more properly, a moving thing) traverses a spacial distance. We can see then why time might be spoken of as though it were space: time is that through which things (are said to) move over a certain i.e., a process of bringing something potential to actual existence. Admittedly " actualization" , like m any other words with " -tion" and "-sion" endings, can be used to refer either to a process or to the result of a process. -This definition might seem circular since it uses "before" and " after" , apparently time-words, in the definition of " tim e" . But it is not, since the reference is to the " before" and " after" of change -i.e., to points which are closer to or farther from the start of the change. 28. This differs from measuring the distance covered by the motion because we see that the same distance may be covered more or less quickly. Relative quickness or speed is measured by taking the tim e of some regular motion and using it as a standard for measuring the time of other, often irregular motions. John is said to be quicker than Henry because he can get from Detroit to Chicago in one day while Henry takes two. Here the regular motion used as a standard is the apparent motion of the sun. 29. The point is not whether we can actually do these things, but only that we say we can. 30. S m a r t , art. cit., pp. 225-227.
31. This expression is itself a figure of speech. The decay that affects material things as they age is an instance rather than a cause of change. Sometimes however we do say that change in the m aterial out of which something is made causes that thing to decay: " Rotting wood caused the collapse of the bridge." 1 would agree fully that problems of meaning cannot possibly be dealt with if one abstracts from the uses a word actually has in everyday speech. Whether a word has one or several uses (i.e., whether there is " something com mon" to all its uses), and if several, whether there are discernable relationships between some o f these usesthese are questions to be resolved only by attention to actual usage. There is no way to decide a p riori how many uses a word might have, and I did not begin the investigation with the assumption that there had to be one " common feature" referred to in each use o f the word " tim e" . It seemed further that the collection of ordinary-language uses o f "tim e" should be fairly extensive, if possible, since I wanted it to be evident that the examples were not being selected to fit a pre-existing hypothesis. (As previously mentioned, there was no effort or claim to be exhaustive.)
This method is, I believe, appropriate to the purpose o f the undertaking, which was to show that beginning with the attention to ordinary language which W ittgens tein so cogently advocates, one could discern (not impose) relationships between various groups o f uses, and that one could say more about these relationships than Wittgenstein says in calling them family relationships. (As to whether I discerned or imposed the relationships set forth in the foregoing classification, 1 can only ask the reader to remind himself of ordinary usage as he works through the categories there described.) With respect to the results obtained, I was quite surprised at the number and diversity of time-expressions to be found in common speech, and again surprised by the relatively small number of major categories which emerged. I was not surprised at the relationships observable between and within these major categories -else why would we find only one word used in so many different ways?
In general the results might be characterized as follow s: many of the various uses of " tim e" turned out to be related more or less closely, in different and specifiable34 ways, to various aspects of change. We might speculate about why this is so -that is, why there are so many time-expressions, and why they seem to be connected in various ways with change.35 But whatever the reason might be, the investigation indicates clearly that this linkage of these expressions with change is a linguistic fact.
But does this amount to a claim that all time-expressions refer to " something com m on" ? 36 I believe it does not, since the uses are clearly diverse in the ways in which they are related to change or process. "Time" is used differently, has a different grammar, for clocking and for dating. The third major category o f its uses contains references to the various conventional systems of clocking and dating. And finally we have the widely, even wildly, diverse category o f its figurative uses. There does not appear to be any determinate common feature here -that is, something actually or virtually the same, some "essence" to which each time-expression refers.37 Instead we have what Wittgenstein would call family resemblances between the various uses of " tim e" .38
34. It will be noted that the categories themselves, together with the subsequent explanatory m aterial, do indeed specify the particular relationships.
35. This note should perhaps be mentally bracketed since it contains conjecture about the real world. Elsewhere I have attem pted to engage only in analysis of common speech, with no assumptions about the world as such -other than the assumption that I can distinguish common from uncommon usage. Change seems to be a basic condition of human life. The world around us is constantly in flux; human beings are material things as well, subject to processes o f growth and decay, fated eventually to die.
Since change affects us all in this very personal way it is not surprising that we speak of it so frequently. It seems as though all human activities, all the forms of life which W ittgenstein wants us to take as basic in our speculations (E.g., see PI, II, p. 226.), occur in a changing world, and all or most of the activities themselves involve change. They may therefore be " timed" -clocked a n d /o r d a te d ; though the extent to which this is actually done varies from culture to culture. This hypothesis is of course open to dispute. But if we attend simply to ordinary usage I think it is undeniable that many time-expressions are used in contexts having something to do with change. 36. Ibid., §# 65-67. 38. It seems, however, W ittgenstein to the contrary notwithstanding, that at times a common noun may indeed refer to " something comm on" each tim e it is used. Dr. Khatchadourian argues persuasively (art. ult. cit.) that all activities called games have in common a definite purpose or capacity -namely to serve the particular human need of pleasure or enjoyment under " standard" conditions or in " norm al" contexts. In it we find a) the attem pt to answer the question " W hat is tim e?" by reminding the questioner how the word " time" is ordinarily used; b) a story designed to show how strange, how unlike ordinary experience and behavior it would be for someone really not to know how to use " tim e "; c) a reminder of how complicated and various are the uses of this word, and how intertwined with the uses of other w ords; and d) an attem pt to account for the apparent mysteriousness of tim e (actually an attempted reductio ad absurdum of the effort to answer the question " W hat is tim e?" Time turns out to be like a eth er; indeed aether, he claims, is nothing but condensed time. All of which sounds, as it is intended to, like a lot of hot air.) Bouwsma sees this sort of question as a pseudoquestion; since the question itself involves a misuse of the word "tim e" , nothing but non-sense can result from the effort to answer it. The only proper response is to indicate some of the ways the word is actually used in ordinary speech. We want to establish an order in our knowledge o f the use of language: an order with a particular end in view ; one out o f many possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with. The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work.44
As long, then, as we do not propose to undertake a general or overall reform of language so as to make it conform more closely to som e supposedly " ideal" language, as long as we attend to language "when it is doing work" , Wittgenstein would, I believe, have no objection. 45 Thirdly, Wittgenstein might claim that what is achieved by such a classification is simply recalling how we use the word "tim e" in ordinary speech -i.e., what he himself recommends. But this sort o f analysis does differ from simple recall, it seems to me, by being explicit rather than implicit, by being clear and orderly rather than vague and indistinct. It is knowing the same thing (i.e., the uses o f a word), but knowing it better.
And for whom would this "better" knowledge be useful? For anyone seriously studying some subject matter which is affected by or closely connected to tim e: the theoretical physicist, the historian and the historiographer, the moral philosopher, or the Christian theologian, among others. I would maintain that this usefulness for 44 . PI, # 132. A uthor's italics.
45. W ittgenstein is speaking here of establishing an order for a particular practical purpose; he is making room for new terminology when that might be useful. I suspect that his notion of a legitimate " particular purpose" might be narrower than mine -his would include only the prevention of misunderstandings in practice, while mine would include enjoyment as well, and possibly others. Note that he is not concerned with discovering and recording whatever order might already exist in ordinary language.
287 particular subject matters, while limited (it is certainly not necessary for everyone), is nonetheless real. Fourthly, as a result o f his "extreme aversion from a systematic exhibition of the logic of particular regions o f language" which Strawson noted, I believe that Wittgenstein thoroughly obscures, if he doesn't actually deny, the referring or mentioning function46 that some words have. Expressions such as common nouns preceeded by "the" , proper names, personal, impersonal and demonstrative pronouns are often used to refer to one or more persons, places, things, processes or states of affairs. When so used they often, though not always, function as the grammatical subject of a sentence. Referring to something implies, but does not assert, that that thing exists in some way or other -such that it can be talked about, such that assertions can be made about it, such that the speaker can assume that whoever he is addressing can know what he is talking about.
In his early period Wittgenstein equated the meaning of a word or expression to the object to which it " pointed" , the thing it mirrored or stood fo r; he supposed that a perfectly clear or " ideal" language had to have its words in one-to-one correspon dence with things. When he later rejected this as being an inadequate account o f real or " ordinary" linguistic phenomena, he came to regard the referring or " pointing" function of language as something not to be discussed, since to him it seemed an integral part o f the misleading picture o f language whose spell he had just escaped. He saw questions about what words referred to as almost unavoidably generative of pseudoproblems. And he would respond to them not by a further effort to designate the object or objects referred to, but by urging the questioner simply to contemplate the ways in which the word is used in the contexts it has in ordinary speech. I think he was mistaken in this. He erred by failing to distinguish between an expression (which has a meaning) and the various uses o f that expression -among which, sometimes, we find its referring use. 47 It was an important step forward for contemporary philosophy when Wittgens tein realized that the declarative or descriptive use of language was only one among the many diverse language games we play. But from this insight o f his it does not follow that we can or should say nothing about the (very common) referring use that many expressions have. I would claim that many language games simply cannot be played without employing, explicitly or implicitly, words that refer. It would seem to make little difference whether you are asserting, asking, commanding, praising, 46 . " The mentioning function of a word" is here taken as equivalent to "the referring function of a word i.e., to mention something is to refer to it. I am aware of the distinction between the use and the mention of a word, between formal and m aterial supposition. However I am not talking about the mention of a word, but the use of a word to mention (= refer to) some thing. 47. The meaning of an expression is here taken as equivalent to the rules or conventions governing all its uses, and is to be carefully distinguished from the actual particular uses it might have. Among the particular uses are often uses of the expression to refer to something. The referring function of a meaningful expression (of the sort capable of exercising that function) -i.e., whether or not it actually refers to something -depends upon the context of each particular use. "This book" is a meaningful expression since there are ordinary language conventions governing its use. But whether it refers to a particular book depends on who says it, where and how it is said, the linguistic context (the kind of language game being played), and often on the physical context -whether or not there is a book at hand to which the speaker can be seen to be referring. It is surely over-puritanical to hold that, just because the claims made for such new ways [of looking at the world -i.e., logical atomism] were too large, we should be concerned solely with preventing ourselves from seeing the world afresh. We might m ake room for a purged kind of metaphysics, with more modest and less disputable claims than the old. (" Review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations," in the Pitcher anthology cited above, note 37; p. 34,) 51. This answer to W ittgenstein is also an answer to Bouwsma (see above, note 42.) Professor Bouwsma is surely correct in saying that time-language is intertwined with the languages of other things. But without denying the possibilities of confusion that m ake this area of language both " playground" and " labyrinth" , I want to stress the possibility, and utility, of drawing a map. A m ap makes no claim to be a comprehensive picture, but it can delineate some of the principal features of the area, show a few pathways, prevent people from getting completely lost. I believe the analysis presented here is, in fact, that sort of map. It indicates a way of dealing with the question " W hat is tim e?" that offers a genuine alternative to dismissing it as an instance of linguistic confusion, because this way of handling it is based on very careful attention to common use; and it suggests an answer to that question which seems to me neither meaningless nor unduly confusing: "Tim e" (t,) is used to refer to a system of measuring the duration or period of an activity by comparing that duration with the duration of some regular motion or apparent motion. The latter functions as a standard of measurement, a " yardstick" -or more precisely, as a clock. This answer, though perhaps not found ipsissimis verbis in ordinary language, is certainly based on ordinary language and thoroughly consistent with it. One has only to recall the common answers to two sets of questions: a) W hat time is it? or, How long did such-and-such an activity take? Then, after an ordinary response: b) How do you know (what tim e it is, or how long it took)? Are you sure? The ordinary response to this is a statem ent regarding the standard or " clock" employed -and the use of a standard of m easurement always implies a system or convention for measuring. W hat is time, then ?T im e is a system of measuring... Q. E. D.
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In conclusion I shall restate briefly the thesis of this paper, then attempt to show where I agree with Wittgenstein, and where I disagree.
Wittgenstein states that the various uses o f a word display what he calls a " family resemblance" , that is, "a complicated network o f similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail." 52 And that, he believes, is all one should say about the different uses a word might have. Any effort to say more, to describe these uses and their mutual relationships in more precise terms is most likely inspired by an unhealthy (because futile and confusing) desire to uncover the "hidden essence" referred to by the word in question.5' All that is really necessary is to recall the common uses o f the word, and note (if one is so inclined) that they bear a family resemblance one to another.
My contention is that while W ittgenstein's assertion about family resemblance is often true, it is a) not the limit of what can be said about the different uses o f a word, and b) inadequate for various legitimate purposes. The first point is demonstrated by specifying these uses and their interrelationships in some detail -relying at every step, o f course, on the recall of common usage which Wittgenstein demands. The second is proved by pointing to several legitim ate54 purposes a more intensive analysis might have.
Wittgenstein's error then is to restrict unnecessarily the range of analysis. One possible consequence would be a neglect of grammar, of linguistic structure. This has not turned out to be serious; in fact structural analysis has not been neglected. Another result is the refusal to regard any form o f metaphysical question as more than the product o f linguistic confusion. I am inclined to disagree here, since such a position does not actually take common language seriously. In fact, common speech does often tend towards metaphysical speculation o f one sort or another, and it is not p e r se evident that all such speculation results from linguistic confusion. Only a prior assumption about the possibility of metaphysical knowledge -prior, that is, to any examination of ordinary language -could lead to such a conclusion; such prior assumptions are usually based on some philosophical or scientific theory about human knowledge rather than on careful attention to what people actually say.
Though I accept many o f W ittgenstein's main points,55 my position differs in assigning more value to the study of linguistic structure; it differs by regarding 52. PI, § 6 6 . 53. O f course W ittgenstein does concede the possibility of " reforming" language, of pointing out commonly overlooked distinctions -for particular practical purposes. We may examine and classify our uses of a word, improve our terminology, in order to prevent misunderstandings in practice. (Ibid., # 132.) This is equivalent to the clarity of expression which I proposed as one of the legitimate purposes o f extensive analysis. But the question raised in this essay is whether there are other legitimate purposes, and on that I think there is substantial disagreement. 54. By " legitimate" I mean purposes a) which are useful or enjoyable in common life, and b) which do not necessarily entail the pseudoproblems which result from lack of attention to the purpose and content of particular utterances.
55. The position taken in this paper is argued solely from premises proposed by W ittgenstein himself, and agrees with him in holding that meaning appears only in the uses a word has, that language is a human activity and as such irreducible to any single logical pattern or scheme, that careful attention to the particular uses of words in common speech can dispel m any puzzlements or pseudoproblems, and that the analysis of any word or expression is incomplete unless one considers the purpose and context of what is said.
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meaning as the general directions or guidelines for the correct use of a word, rather than as equivalent to each use; and it differs, at least to some extent, with regard to the legitimate purposes o f detailed analysis. The very fruitful development o f ordinary language philosophy in the years since Wittgenstein's death, a development stemming chiefly from his insights about the central importance o f common usage, is clear evidence that many o f his closest disciples have rejected as unjustified the limits to analysis he sought to impose.
